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MUNICIPAL DERIVATIVES USE AND
THE SUITABILITY DOCTRINE
I. INTRODUCTION
The market for the financial instruments known as derivatives' has
grown tremendously in the past decade.2 Their emerging ubiquity has
not been evenly matched by reform in the regulation of financial markets
in the United States. Falling between haphazardly drawn lines of
regulatory regimes,3 derivatives have remained largely unregulated
1. See infra note 16 for a definition of derivatives.
2. See infra part II for a discussion of derivatives. See infra text accompanying notes
27-28 for figures regarding the volume of derivatives use.
3. Several federal agencies currently play a role in derivatives regulation. The
Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) has jurisdiction over commodities
futures, commodities options, and options on commodity futures. The Securities Exchange
Commission (SEC) has jurisdiction over options on securities and securities indices. Jean
S. Chan & Richard L. Zack, Critical Legal Issues Relating to Derivatives, in MANAGING
RISK EXPOSURE IN DERIVATIVES, at 297 (PLI Corp. Law & Practice Course Handbook
Series No. B-893, 1994). The CFTC also has jurisdiction over swaps, but has exempted
private swaps from all but antifraud regulation. See 7 U.S.C. § 2(i) (1994) (establishing
CFTC jurisdiction); 7 U.S.C. § 2(ii) (1994) (exempting swaps not traded on a board of
exchange from regulation); 7 U.S.C. § 6b(b) (1994) (antifraud provision for non-exchange-
traded swaps). See infra note 20 for a definition of swap transactions. Some derivatives
(known as hybrids) combine elements of futures and options. This process often creates
jurisdictional disputes among regulatory agencies. Kenneth M. Raisler & Barbara J.
Morgen, Legal Aspects of Commodity Derivatives, in SWAPS AND OTHER DERIVATIVES IN
1992, at 225, 228 (PLI Corp. Law & Practice Course Handbook Series No. 778, 1992).
The Federal Deposit Insurance Commission (FDIC) has jurisdiction over all institutions
holding Federal Deposit Insurance. See FDIC Interpretive Letter (FIL-34-94. May 18,
1994). The Federal Reserve Board regulates bank derivatives activities. See News
Release, OCC Issues Guidelines on Bank Derivative Activities, OCCNR 93-116, 1993 WL
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despite their complexity, size, and growing importance to the rest of the
financial system.4 In the wake of recently publicized reports of heavy
losses attributed to the improvident use of derivatives,5 and following a
comprehensive study of the derivatives industry by the General
Accounting Office (GAO),6 House Banking Chair James Leach
introduced the Risk Management Improvement and Derivatives Oversight
Act (H.R. 20). H.R. 20, a bill that creates a federal derivatives
commission, contains provisions which, if adopted, will completely
reform regulation of the derivatives market.8 Recognizing that several
municipalities have recently been involved in large derivatives losses,
9
438487 (Oct. 27, 1993) (announcing and describing regulations) [hereinafter OCC News
Release].
In a recent derivatives fraud case, the SEC and the CFTC reached a joint settlement
with a defendant (Bankers Trust). See News Release, SEC Announces Institution and
Settlement of Proceedings Against BT Securities Involving Derivative Securities Sold to
Gigson, SEC 94-108, 1994 WL 710062 (Dec. 22, 1994) (describing terms of settlement).
In addition, the Federal Reserve arranged a written supervisory agreement with the bank.
BOARD OF GOVERNORS OF THE FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM, WRITTEN AGREEMENT BY
AND AMONG BANKERS TRUST NEW YORK AND FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF NEW YORK,
1994 WL 736368 (Dec. 4, 1994) (putting forward terms of agreement). Such duplication
of enforcement efforts reflects a diffusion of regulatory oversight. Recognizing the
regulatory confusion wrought by the growing hybridization of the finance markets, a
pending house bill would merge the CFTC and SEC into a single independent agency.
H.R. 718, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995).
4. U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, REPORT TO CONGRESSIONAL REQUESTERS, PUB.
No. B-257099, FINANCIAL DERIVATIVES: AcTIONS NEEDED TO PROTECT THE FINANCIAL
SYSTEM 8 (1994) [hereinafter GAO REPORT] ("Federal regulators have begun to address
derivatives activities through a variety of means, but significant gaps and weaknesses exist
in the regulation of many major OTC [over-the-counter] derivatives dealers.").
5. See John Greenwald, The California Wipeout, TIME, Dec. 19, 1994, at 55; Leah N.
Spiro, Today, Orange County..., BUS. WK., Dec. 19, 1994, at 28; Kathryn M. Welling,
"Toxic Waste" Cleanup, BARRON'S, Sept. 26, 1994, at 22.
6. See generally GAO REPORT, supra note 4 (reporting results of two-year study on
use and regulation of OTC derivatives).
7. H.R. 20, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995). This proposed legislation may encourage
agencies to institute rulemaking procedures in order to pre-empt legislative mandates. See
Letter from John Dingell, Chair, House Committee on Energy and Commerce, to Arthur
Levitt and Zachary Snow (Aug. 10, 1994) in 26TH ANNUAL INSTrTUTE ON SECURITIES
REGULATION 235, 236 (Vol. III - PLI Corp. Law & Practice Course Handbook Series No.
B-868, 1994) (stating that derivatives legislation would follow if agencies did not enact
timely and meaningful reforms).
8. H.R. 20, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995).
9. The bankruptcy of Orange County is merely the most notable illustration of
municipal loss in which derivatives played a major part. See Laura Jereski & Thomas T.
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H.R. 20 provides a regulatory mandate to develop rules applicable
specifically to municipal investment in derivatives.'0 Although earlier
versions of this bill contained a "suitability" standard with regard to
trades in derivatives," Congress removed this provision from subse-
quent versions of the bill.
Nevertheless, at a series of recent hearings before Congress, a
discourse emerged on the utility of applying a "suitability" standard to
brokers selling derivatives to municipalities. 2 This Note argues that a
Vogel Jr., Orange County Crisis: The Fallout, Other Municipal Funds May Be Burdened
with Bitter Results of Risky Investments, WALL ST. J., Dec. 8, 1994, at A12. ("Across the
country, from Southern California to Texas, to Ohio, other towns and cities are grappling
with leveraged-investment strategies gone awry.").
10. H.R 20 provides with respect to municipalities:
§ 104. FUNCTIONS OF COMMISSION.
(a)(3) [T]he Commission may establish differing standards for different
classes of financial institutions, including, but not limited to, dealers,
end-users, or municipalities as appropriate.
(b)(1) [T]he Commission shall consider and may make recommendations for
... regulatory action by the Federal financial institution regulatory agencies
in ... matters related to financial institutions engaged in derivatives
activities, including the need to establish principles and standards for...
(I) Minimum prudential practices for municipalities and pension funds that
may use derivatives ....
§ 106. RISK MANAGEMENT TRAINING.
The Commission shall develop training seminars in risk management
techniques related to derivatives activities for employees of state or local
governments and financial institutions.
H.R. 20, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995).
11. For a discussion of the suitability doctrine, see infra part V.
12. At these hearings, the securities industry was vociferous in its opposition to any
type of suitability rule: "To impose a responsibility of this type on dealers would
encourage counterparties to believe that they are not ultimately responsible for their
investment decisions and will encourage litigation to lay financial responsibility for
unsuccessful investment strategies at the door of the professional dealer." Derivative
Financial Instruments Relating to Banks and Financial Institutions: Hearings Before the
Senate Comm. on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, 104th Cong., Ist Sess. 219 (1995)
(statement of Marc E. Lackritz, President, Securities Industry Association) [hereinafter
Lackritz statement]. The municipal investor lobby was equally adamant that such controls
be instated to protect the public. Noting the "intense marketing of these products to local
government finance officers by the broker/dealer industry," and the often limited
knowledge of such salespeople, they have called for "clarification or issuance of suitability
1996]
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federal suitability standard should be applied to the sale of derivatives to
municipalities. Part II introduces the subject of derivatives. Part III
examines the nature of municipal investment and the present use of
derivatives by municipalities. Part IV discusses the problems associated
with state regulation of municipal investing and derivatives use. Part V
proposes a clarification of the suitability doctrine that could play a
central role in effective federal regulation. Finally, Part VI addresses the
possible impact of a strong suitability rule on municipal access to
derivatives.
II. DERIVATIVES
The world of finance has evolved significantly in the past several
years. National economies are increasingly characterized by global
interdependence. 3 Yet world commodities prices, interest rates, and
currency exchange rates have become increasingly volatile.14 Participa-
tion in the global economy has increasingly meant exposure to the
vagaries of macroeconomic forces out of the control of any individual
market participant. 5
The financial world has responded to these undesired risks of market
volatility with a steady stream of sophisticated new investment instru-
rules for derivatives to assure that the products recommended by a broker or dealer are
appropriate for the State or local government entity." Derivative Financial Instruments
Relating to Banks and Financial Institutions, Hearings Before the Senate Comm. on
Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. 162 (1995) (statement of
Bonnie Ridley Kraft, President, Government Finance Officers Association and City
Manager, City of Gresham, Oregon) [hereinafter Kraft statement].
13. Paul Gillespie, "Butterfly Effect" Makes Markets Flap, IRISH TIMES, Mar. 25,
1995, at 10.
14. See GAO REPORT, supra note 4, at 39-44 (citing historical trend of increasing
volatility). See also Adam R. Waldman, OTC Derivatives & Systemic Risk: Innovative
Finance or the Dance Into the Abyss?, 43 AM. U. L. REV. 1023, 1033 (1994) (citing stock
market fluctuations of 1987 and 1989 as a factor impelling institutional investors to use
hedging on a widespread scale); Thomas D. Willett, The Causes and Effects of Exchange
Rate Volatility, in THE INTERNATIONAL MONETARY SYSTEM: A TIME OF TURBULENCE 33
n.7 (Jacob S. Dreyer et al. eds., 1982) (noting study demonstrating that increased volatility
creates higher transactions costs in world trade).
15. For example, assume that a U.S. company contracts for the future purchase of a
widget from a Mexican company. If they agree on a price in either country's currency,
and the currency rates do not remain fixed, one party will benefit and the other will suffer
to the extent of the change in currency valuation. Yet neither party intended this result
to be a part of their agreement. To the extent that currency fluctuation creates uncertainty,
it tends to discourage international trade.
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ments. Derivatives, 6 comprised of variations on forwards, 7  fu-
tures,18 options,19 and swaps,20 are a group of investment instruments
that market participants may use to free themselves from undesired
market risks.2' Over-the-counter derivatives are individual agreements
between two parties to exchange money based on fluctuations in the
value of an underlying market.22 Other types of derivatives may be
16. "The term derivative ... refers to all financial instruments whose prices are
dependent upon the price of cash market items, whether those items be oil, metals,
soybeans, stocks or foreign currency." Raisler & Morgen, supra note 3, at 258 n.l.
17. The CFTC offered the following definition for a forward contract:
First, the contract must be a binding agreement on both parties to the contract:
one must agree to make delivery and the other to take delivery of the
commodity. Second, because forward contracts are commercial, merchandising
transactions which result in delivery, the courts and the Commission have
looked for evidence of the transaction's use in commerce. Thus, the courts and
the Commission have examined whether the parties to the contracts are
commercial entities that have the capacity to make or take delivery and whether
such delivery, in fact, routinely occurs under such contracts.
OGC Interpretive Statement Regarding Characteristics Distinguishing Cash and Forward
Contract and "Trade" Options, 50 Fed. Reg. 39,656, 39,657 (1985) (footnotes omitted),
quoted in Raisler & Morgen, supra note 3, at 235.
18. The CFTC defines a futures contract as follows:
An agreement to purchase or sell a commodity for delivery in the future: (I) at
a price that is determined at initiation of the contract; (2) which is normally
traded on a board of trade by members of the exchange; (3) which is used to
assume or shift price risk; and (4) which obligates each party to the contract
either to fulfill the terms of the contract or offset the contract by entering into
an opposite transaction (by far, the more commonly chosen alternative).
CFTC Glossary of Trade Terms, June 5, 1985, quoted in Raisler & Morgen, supra note
3, at 231.
19. An option is a "[r]ight, exercisable at the option of the holder (and thus not an
obligation), to buy or sell a security or commodity at a given price within, or at a given
time." MICHAEL D. RICE, THE PRENTICE-HALL DICTIONARY OF BUSINESs, FINANCE AND
LAW 245 (1983) (citation omitted).
20. A swap transaction is "an agreement between two parties to exchange a series of
cash flows measured by different interest rates, exchange rates, or prices with payments
calculated by reference to a principal base (notional amount)." Policy Statement
Concerning Swap Transactions, 54 Fed. Reg. 30,694, 30,695 (1989).
21. For example, airlines can purchase the option to buy jet fuel at specified moderate
prices in the future. If the price of jet fuel rises significantly, they can exercise their
option and purchase jet fuel at moderate prices and thereby avoid the risks of a volatile
fuel market. This process is known as "hedging" risk. See infra note 53 for a definition
of hedging.
22. See GAO REPORT, supra note 4, at 24-25.
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purchased through exchanges' at prevailing prices.24  Unlike capital
investments, derivatives do not help create wealth; they merely shift risk
from one party to another.' The technology to manage market risks by
the use of derivatives represents an historic breakthrough in the world of
finance and stands to make the world a more efficient place.26 The
utility of derivatives to help manage risk has been quickly recognized;
in the past ten years, their use has increased over a thousand-fold."
With a current notional value estimated above thirty-eight trillion
dollars," derivatives are significant economic tools that will become a
permanent fixture of modem finance.
Mortgage derivatives, such as stripped mortgage-backed securities
and collateralized mortgage obligations, are analogically distinct from
derivatives." However, many of the concerns about derivatives are
23. A number of exchanges sell derivatives. For example, the American Stock
Exchange sells options on individual stocks; the Chicago Board of Trade sells futures and
options on futures; the Chicago Board of Options Exchange sells options on individual
stocks; the Chicago Mercantile Exchange, Coffee, Sugar and Cocoa Exchange, Commodity
Exchange, Kansas City Board of Trade, MidAmerica Commodity Exchange, Minneapolis
Grain Exchange, and New York Cotton Exchange each sells futures and options on
futures; the New York Futures Exchange sells futures and options on stock indexes; the
New York Mercantile Exchange sells futures and options on futures; the Pacific Stock
Exchange sells options on individual stocks, and the Philadelphia Stock Exchange sells
futures and options on individual stocks, currencies, and stock indexes. ROBERT W. KOLB,
FINANCIAL DERIvATIVS 79, Table 3.1 (1993).
24. Prevailing prices are determined by "open-outcry," a process by which each bid
for sale and purchase of each derivative is offered to all traders in the "pit" at the floor of
the exchange that trades that particular derivative. Id. at 25. See also SHELDON M. JAFFE,
BROKER-DEALERS AND SECURITIES MARKETS: A GUIDE TO THE REGULATORY PROCESS
221-24 (1977) (discussing trade on the Chicago Board of Options).
25. Lackritz statement, supra note 12, at 217.
26. See id. at 218 (stating that "derivatives increase economic efficiency by allowing
the transfer of risk to those most willing to bear it").
27. See Waldman, supra note 14, at 1032..
28. Recent Derivatives Losses: Hearing Before the Comm. on Banking, Finance and
Urban Affairs, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. 54 (1994) (statement of Henry B. Gonzalez,
Chairman) [hereinafter Gonzalez statement].
29. Mortgage derivatives are receivables; they function essentially like variable rate
bonds. They are often heavily processed and tailored to create "designer" investment
products that perform very differently under varying economic conditions. For example,
interest-only strips (10 strips) give the holder the right to receive only the interest portion
of a pool of govemment-administered home loans. In the event prevailing interest rates
fall and homeowners prepay their mortgages to refinance (thus avoiding the bulk of
interest payments) the holders of 10 strips will lose a substantial amount of their
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_urbanlaw/vol49/iss1/11
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applicable to this market, thus warranting a brief explanation. Created
from pools of mortgage obligations accruing from government loan
programs a mortgage derivatives are customized by severing mortgage
obligations into their fundamental parts, (for example, interest and
principal) and creating different financial instruments out of the streams
of payments accruing from these parts. These products are then sold in
the secondary mortgage markets.3' Some of these products expose their
holders to substantial market risks that depend on unpredictable aspects
of the economy.32 Many purchasers have failed to appreciate the
distinction between credit risk and market risk and have sustained large
losses on investments they assumed were conservative. Further, the
performance of these securities under different economic scenarios is
investment because the interest payments are no longer owed. See Rebecca Cumin, Note,
The NASD's Fair Sales Practice Rules: An Argumentfor Their Application to Government
Securities Transactions, and for the Consideration of Some New Rules in the Mortgage
Market, 1993 COLUM. Bus. L. REV. 191 (1993). For a discussion of recent difficulties
experienced with more complicated mortgage derivatives, see Welling, supra note 5, at
22-29.
30. The underlying mortgages are created through the Government National Mortgage
Association (Ginnie Mae), the Federal National Mortgage Association (Fannie Mae), and
the Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation (Freddie Mac). See Cumin, supra note 29,
at 198. Ginnie Mae mortgages are backed by the federal government. Id. at 198 n.36.
Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac are private corporations, considered secure from credit risk.
Id.
31. For a history and explanation of the secondary mortgage market, see KENNETH G.
LORE, MORTGAGE-BACKED SECURrTIES, DEVELOPMENTS AND TRENDS IN THE SECONDARY
MORTGAGE MARKET 1-14, 15 (1995 ed.). For a discussion of the economic advantages
of a secondary mortgage market, see id. at 1-26.
32. These unpredictable facets of the economy can encompass nearly anything that
changes the way in which people pay back their debts: e.g., changes in interest rates or a
depression.
33. See Randall Smith & John Connor, Matter of Security: Risky Derivatives Are Huge
Source of Funds for Federal Agencies, WALL ST. J., Jan. 20, 1995, Al, A7 (quoting a
1993 letter from Matthew Raabe, former assistant treasurer of Orange County, to an
investor. "We kept risk low by purchasing United States government securities which are
universally accepted as having nearly no risk of default."); see also Cumin, supra note 29,
at 192, 211 (decrying the lack of fair practice rules in the government securities industry).
1996]
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often difficult to determine.34 Thus, the argument for a suitability rule
for over-the-counter derivatives applies with equal force to mortgage
derivatives in the government securities market.35
Regardless of their nature, derivatives designed to reduce risk can
also be used as a speculative device, thereby increasing exposure to
market risks rather than eliminating them.36 While investors may
legitimately use derivatives for both risk-reducing and risk-enhancing
activities, the speculative nature of risk-enhancing derivatives and their
potential to produce large losses have been a source of growing
concern.37 In some cases, their effects can be simply catastrophic, as
the recent Barings Investment Bank bankruptcy makes plain.38
34. For example, determining the percent of homeowners likely to prepay their
mortgages under various economic conditions strains the limits of modem computer
modeling. Many evaluations of mortgage securities rely on worst-case scenarios, and do
not purport to predict investment returns with any degree of accuracy. See KENNETH G.
LORE, MORTGAGE BACKED SECURrTIs app. § 9-67 (1995 ed.) (example of a rating
analysis for a pool of home mortgages).
35. See Cumin, supra note 29, at 217-18 (arguing that regulation of mortgage
derivatives is presently inadequate and that new regulations should be implemented to
increase risk disclosure and provide fair practice rules).
36. Gonzalez statement, supra note 28, at 54-55 (noting that Denis Healy, former
British Chancellor of the Exchequer, has estimated that 98% of foreign exchange
transactions are speculative in nature).
Returning to the "jet fuel option" hypothetical, supra note 21, assume that, instead of
an airline, Lemon County is the investor. Lemon County has no intrinsic interest in jet
fuel. It can still buy jet fuel options and hope that fuel prices rise. If so, it can sell that
option at a higher price to an airline that can no longer afford to feed its passengers
because it is spending so much on fuel. Alternatively, if fuel prices fail to rise, and the
option expires without being executed or sold (at a deep discount), the investment is a total
loss.
37. Former House Banking, Finance and Urban Affairs Committee Chair, Henry
Gonzalez has been a vocal critic of speculation in this often arcane area of finance:
For the past several years I have expressed increasing concern over the rapid
growth in the derivatives market, especially the uncontrolled growth in new,
complex derivative products that are misunderstood by even the most
sophisticated investors.
But the most worrisome aspect of the derivatives market is the fact that much
of the underpinnings of the trillion dollar a day global derivatives market is
rampant speculation and gambling.
Gonzalez statement, supra note 28, at 54.
38. See Sara Webb et al., A Royal Mess: Britain's Barings PLC Bets on Derivatives
-And the Cost Is Dear, WALL ST. J., Feb. 27, 1995, at Al. Twenty-seven-year-old
derivatives trader Nicholas Leeson singlehandedly bet and lost nearly a billion dollars,
sending Barings, a 233 year old British financial institution, into administration (a
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Moreover, because of the sheer complexity of many derivatives
transactions, purchasers may not understand the nature of the risks
involved. 9 As a result, providing market participants with greater
information about risk is one of the reforms proposed by leading
derivative specialists to make the derivatives market a safer place.4
II. MUNICIPAL INVESTMENT AND USE OF DERIVATIVES
A. Municipal Investment Characteristics
As complex financial entities,a" municipalities receive money from
many different sources, invest it for widely varying terms, and use it to
finance a tremendous range of activities."2 Moreover, much municipal
proceeding similar to Chapter 11). Id.
39. Margery Waxman, The Lesson of Orange County: It Takes a Crisis to Focus
Public Policy on the Need for Adequate Disclosure of Risk, 63 Banking Rep. (BNA) No.
23, at 944 (Dec. 19, 1994) ("There is no doubt that the complexity of [derivatives] transac-
tions has made it more difficult for even the most sophisticated senior management to
understand or evaluate the benefits or the risks associated with using these derivatives.").
40. See TECHNICAL COMMITTEE OF THE INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION OF
SECURITIES COMMISSIONS, Operational and Financial Risk Management Control
Mechanisms for Over-the-Counter Derivatives Activities of Regulated Securities Firms, in
26TH ANNUAL INSTITUTE ON SECURITIES REGULATION, at 187, 207 app. (PLI Corp. Law
& Practice Course Handbook Series No. B-868, 1994) (describing risk-reducing proposals
for derivatives markets worldwide); Henry T.C. Hu, Misunderstood Derivatives: The
Causes ofInformational Failure and the Promise OfRegulatory Incrementalism, 102 YALE
L.J. 1457, 1503-13 (1993) (proposing the creation of a system to catalogue all known
types of over-the-counter derivatives, their uses and risks, for the benefit of market
participants and regulators alike). See also GAO REPORT, supra note 4; H.R. 20, supra
note 7.
41. I define municipalities to include towns, cities, and counties. Although counties
are technically "quasi-municipal corporations organized as subordinate agencies of the state
government," in their capacity as investors they may act for the benefit of localities within
their domain rather than as part of the larger state apparatus. CHARLES S. RHYNE, THE
LAW OF LOCAL GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS § 1.5 (1980).
42. Municipal funds range from temporary idle cash funds to long-term pension funds
for government employees. The risk and liquidity considerations for investing such funds
vary considerably. See Derivative Financial Instruments Relating to Banks and Financial
Institutions: Hearings Before the Senate Comm. on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs,
104th Cong., 1st Sess. 190-96 (1995) (statement of Robert D. McKnew, Executive Vice
President, Bank of America and Chairman, Public Securities Association) [hereinafter
McKnew statement].
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revenue derives from taxes.43 Unlike stockholders choosing to contrib-
ute to corporate equity, municipal taxpayers have no meaningful choice
in how their funds are invested. Furthermore, many municipalities rely
on the revenue they collect to provide for basic social services and
infrastructure.' For these reasons, prudent municipal-finance principles
stress the preservation of principal and the maintenance of liquidity over
the often-competing goal of high investment returns.4 For the same
reasons, it is in the public's interest to afford municipalities greater
protections than ordinary institutional investors in the financial market-
place.
Finance officers, however, do not invest their own resources. Thus,
they lack the natural aversion to risk which tends to arise in investors
who feel uncomfortable with the prospect of parting with their own
money."6 Municipal finance officers work in a system in which their
performance is measured, to some degree, by the returns they reap on
investments.47 Though finance officers are expected to follow pruden-
tial guidelines, and though they risk their jobs when they jeopardize
public capital, many feel equally compelled to justify their positions by
43. See LENNOX L. MOAK & ALBERT M. HILLHOUSE, CONCEPTS AND PRACTICES IN
LOCAL GOVERNMENT FINANCE 59 (1975) (listing sources of revenues).
44. In his discussion of social welfare and public service provision in the face of
capital flight, Robert Burchell stated:
[R]ecent research indicates that annual expenditures for municipal services in
older cities have risen by nearly sixty percent over the past decade. On a per
capita basis, central city costs for common municipal functions are twice
suburban rates. Abandoned by private capital, left with a severely deteriorated
infrastructure and faced by the dire poverty of its residents, the local govern-
ment of the intergovernmental city is forced to provide divested private services
(i.e. housing), and to increase levels of traditional public services as well.
ROBERT W. BURCHELL, THE NEW REALITY OF MUNICIPAL FINANCE 11 (1984) (citation
omitted).
45. See Kraft statement, supra note 12, at 224 ("[A]s custodians of public funds
needed for public purposes, State and local government jurisdictions have a much lower
risk tolerance than their private sector counterparts may.'). Id.
46. An additional factor, in some municipalities, may be the practice of broker-dealers
to make contributions to public officials' campaign funds. See Joanne Morrison, Use Your
Head When You Manage Public Investments, SEC's Levitt Warns, BOND BUYER, June 14,
1995, at 1.
47. See MOAK & HILLHOUSE, supra note 43, at 29-30 (outlining three goals in local
government finance organization). See also id. at 201-06 (discussing investment
strategies).
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taking risks that may produce generous returns.48 In times of low
interest rates, which generally coincide with lower investment returns,
such pressure may become acute.49 Moreover, if a finance officer's
investments perform poorly, that officer's objective interests may diverge
from the interests of the municipality. That is, a finance officer with a
poorly performing set of investments may desire to take larger risks in
order to recoup losses and mitigate an apparent personal failure. At the
same time, the objective interests of the municipality would favor
accepting the temporary losses and minimizing any further declines.
This potential conflict of interests has important implications for the
development of a proper regulatory strategy. °
B. Municipal Use of Derivatives
The sheer number and variety of municipalities make generalizations
about their collective use of derivatives difficult. Overall, half of all
municipalities are thought to invest in some form of derivative financial
device.5' A recent GAO report provides detailed information on the
municipal use of designer over-the-counter derivatives.52 In 1992, four
percent of localities used this type of derivative either as a hedge53 or
48. Finance officers are often willing to invest funds in financial markets that have a
low probability of catastrophe. This tendency may be understood in part by reference to
the "threshold effect," the psychological tendency to ignore certain possibilities below a
critical threshold level. For a discussion of cognitive bias and derivatives investing, see
Hu, supra note 40, at 1488-90.
49. In California, reduction of property tax revenues resulting from a decline in real
estate values has further exacerbated the revenue pinch and the resultant drive to increase
municipal investment returns. Jereski & Vogel, supra note 9, at A12.
50. For example, a financial officer may have a personal interest in recouping previous
losses that have accrued to a municipality (perhaps fearing the loss of a job due to poor
investment returns or poor management). Lesser conflicts may include a finance officer's
ego maintenance. From the standpoint of a municipality, these interests are irrational and
potentially destructive. In circumstances where it appears that a finance officer's interests
conflict with those of a municipality, one solution is to assure that suspicious trades are
cleared through an independent person having the interests of the municipality, and not the
finance officer, foremost in mind. One way to screen for "suspicious" trades is to
scrutinize all trades that may be deemed "unsuitable" for the municipality.
51. Waxman, supra note 39, at 944 (citing GAO estimate of use of derivatives by
states, municipalities, and pension funds).
52. GAO REPORT, supra note 4, at 130.
53. The process of hedging entails "enter[ing] into a transaction intended to protect
against losses in another transaction for the purchase or sale of a commodity or security."
RICE, supra note 19, at 172.
19961
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as a speculative device. 4  Municipalities using these specialized
derivatives tended to be much larger entities in terms of market assets
than were non-users." Users identified hedging and bolstering rates of
return as the most common purposes,56 and also cited derivatives use
as a way to participate in equity markets.57
IV. LIMITATIONS OF STATE REGULATION
Municipalities fulfill for their citizens a role similar to that of
investment companies for private investors. Nonetheless, Congress
explicitly excluded state and local governments from regulation under the
Investment Company Act (ICA).58 Under the ICA, the SEC promul-
gates prudential standards for holdings of money-market mutual funds
with the goal of preserving stable asset values.59 The municipality
exception recognizes federalist principles by preventing direct federal
54. In the GAO survey, localities are defined as "municipalities, special districts, and
counties." GAO REPORT, supra note 4, at 130. Four percent translated to 134 localities
using over-the-counter derivatives in 1992.
55. Id. at 144 (reporting total market assets averaging $490 million for local users of
derivatives; non-user market assets averaged $80 million).
56. The GAO asked specifically about improving rates of return because this is an
indictor of pure speculative activity. Id.
57. States traditionally forbid municipalities to invest in the stock market because
stocks are considered unsuitably risky investments. But municipalities may be able to
participate vicariously by purchasing options on equities. This is an avenue for future state
oversight and reform. See Laurie Morse, Borrowings Raised Ante in Orange County
Debacle, FIN. TIMES, Dec. 15, 1994, at 38 (noting that Orange County invested in
tailor-made structured notes while prohibited from investing in common stock).
58. Investment Company Act of 1940, 15 U.S.C. § 80a-2(b). The Investment
Company Act provides, in pertinent part:
No provision in [the Investment Company Act] shall apply to, or be deemed to
include ... a State, or any political subdivision of a State, or any agency,
authority, or instrumentality of any one or more of the foregoing ... or any
officer, agent, or employee of any of the foregoing acting as such in the course
of his official duty....
15 U.S.C. § 80a-2(b) (1994).
59. Derivative Financial Instruments Relating to Banks and Financial Institutions:
Hearings Before the Senate Comm. on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, 104th Cong.,
Ist Sess. 61 n.46 (1995) (statement of Arthur Levitt, Chairman, SEC).
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control over state and local finances.0 However, it also exempts
municipal investment decisions from federal oversight.
Although local elected officials and boards of supervisors oversee
municipal finance decisions,6' these officials may have little interest in,
or understanding of, complex financial matters.62 Many local financial
officers are themselves elected officials. Awareness of their accountabili-
ty at the polls may serve as another check on municipal financial
activities. However, municipal voters can only exert pressure on elected
financial officers to the extent that they are aware of, and are concerned
about, investment practices that jeopardize their tax contributions and the
quality of their local government services. Unfortunately, it may take a
crisis to activate this process.'
In the absence of federal control, states have plenary authority in
regulating municipal investment activities.(' Through legislation, states
create legal lists6' which enumerate acceptable municipal investments
60. Derivative Financial Instruments Relating to Banks and Financial Institutions:
Hearings Before the Senate Comm. on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, 104th Cong.,
1st Sess. 13 (1995) (statement of Senator Robert F. Bennett) (characterizing the prospect
of regulation of derivatives as "heavy-handed").
61. See MOAK & HILLHOUSE, supra note 43, at 31 (discussing a basic local
government finance hierarchy).
62. John C. Coffee, Jr., The Suitability Doctrine Revisited: Can Orange County Sue
Its Brokerfor Recommending the Purchase of Unsuitable Securities for Its Fund?, NAT'L
L.J., Jan. 16, 1995, at B4 (noting the minimal oversight elected boards provide over the
activities of county treasurers). See also Waxman, supra note 39, at 945 (describing
members of municipal boards as "prominent local citizens").
63. See Jodi Wilgoren, Orange County Picks Moorlach as Treasurer, L.A. TIMES,
Mar. 18, 1995, at Al (noting Moorlach's warnings to Orange County voters during his
unsuccessful campaign against Robert Citron for treasurer).
64. Robert D. McKnew, Chairman of the Public Securities Association, characterizes
this federalist accommodation to state power as follows:
State and local pooled investment funds are not regulated on the Federal level
* They are not required to register with the SEC as investment companies
or investment advisors, nor are they subject to the Investment Company Act of
1940, the Investment Advisers Act of 1940, and their accompanying rules.
Nevertheless, State and municipal investments are almost without exception
heavily regulated at the State and local level.
McKnew statement, supra note 42, at 194.
65. The legal-list procedure, also known as the New York Rule, was once a basic
principle of fiduciary duty applicable to private trust relationships. The New York Rule
governed particular fiduciary relationships. Investing outside a legal list represented a
breach of trust. This rule was overturned in Harvard College v. Amory, 26 Mass. (9 Pick.)
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-those that are presumably safe." Sales that do not conform with
state investment statutes are ultra vires,67 and therefore void.68  The
legal-list approach to regulatory investments is often inefficiently
restrictive and out of date. For example, most states forbid state
investment pools from dealing in derivatives entirely.69 Though this
approach may assure safety, rules prohibiting derivatives investments
absolutely, or imposing percentage limitations on their use, frustrate two
legitimate investment goals: the practice of portfolio diversification and
the risk-reducing use of derivatives as hedging devices.70
Modem portfolio theory casts doubt on the efficacy of imposing
black-letter rules to restrict municipal investments.7 ' The theory posits
that the degree of risk (represented by price volatility) of a
well-diversified portfolio is less than the risk associated with each
particular investment device contained within. 72  If the portfolio's
446 (1830). For a history of the transition of trust guidelines from the "New York Rule"
to the "Prudent Man" rule, see Mayo A. Shattuck, The Development of the Prudent Man
Rule for Fiduciary Investment in the United States in the Twentieth Century, 12 OHIO ST.
L.J. 491 (1951).
66. For example, the California rules generally restrict municipalities to low-risk
investments. 5 CAL. GOV'T CODE § 53635 (West 1983 & Supp. 1995).
67. "[An] ultra vires act of [a] municipality is one which is beyond [the] powers
conferred upon it by law." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1522 (6th ed. 1990).
68. In one celebrated case, the British House of Lords declared a swap agreement
involving a British municipality void, resulting in a loss by some eighty banks of a billion
dollars. Waldman, supra note 14, at 1043. See Hazell v. Hammersmith & Fulham
London Borough Council, [1991] 2 W.L.R. 372 (Eng. H.L.) (nullifying ultra vires swap
agreement). For a thorough analysis of the issue of ultra vires trades, municipalities, and
derivatives regulation, see Alexander E. Kolar, Note, Hammersmith Meets Orange County:
"Wishing Upon A Star" With Taxpayer Money in the Municipal Bond Derivative Market,
parts II & III, 49 WASH. U. J. URB. & CONTEMP. L. 315, 319-32 (1996).
69. Only 12 states permit state-run investment pools to invest in derivatives (Arizona,
Connecticut, Florida, Idaho, Kansas, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, Oregon, Texas, Utah,
Washington, and West Virginia). Sharon R. King, Most State Pools Avoid the Pitfalls Of
Orange County, BOND BUYER, Dec. 22, 1994, at 1.
70. See supra note 53 (discussing hedging).
71. For a discussion of the merits of modem portfolio theory and its limitations, see
BURTON G. MALKIEL, A RANDOM WALK DowN WALL STREET 185-236 (4th ed. 1985).
For analysis of the suitability doctrine in light of modem portfolio theory, see Stuart D.
Root, Suitability-The Sophisticated Investor-And Modern Portfolio Management, 1991
COLUM. Bus. L. REv. 287, 347-54 (1991).
72. See MALKIEL, supra note 71, at 196. This occurs because individual investments
in a well-diversified portfolio have a negative co-variance: that is, when some investments
decrease in value, others can be expected to increase. Yet at the same time, the risk
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volatile investments spread the risks in different market sectors, they tend
to balance each other out and provide returns higher than those
achievable through risk-free investments.73 Furthermore, certain risky
investments may operate in an otherwise conservative portfolio to
provide an optimal degree of expected risk and return. For a large
institutional investor, derivatives may be well-suited to diversify a
portfolio. This may be especially true for municipal investors where the
bulk of investments in a portfolio depend entirely on high interest rates
for success.74  To the extent that derivatives may efficiently aid
municipalities in this endeavor, prohibition of their use, even as a
risk-enhancement device, should not be categorical.75
Moreover, derivatives allow municipalities to reduce unwanted risks
through the process of hedging. 76 This may be a significant benefit to
municipalities who face regional economic fluctuations in tax revenue
and whose debt financing often requires fixed payments to municipal
bondholders.77 Ultimately, the categorical prohibition of derivatives use
will begin to erode as derivatives become more common and their
characteristics and usefulness are better understood.
V. THE SUITABILITY DOCTRINE IN FEDERAL REGULATION
Although the states and localities are the primary regulators of
municipal investing,7 the federal government has traditionally been
dividend (the payoff required to lure investors away from risk-free investments) remains
constantly above that of risk-free investments. Id.
73. Id. at 204-05.
74. Municipalities invest heavily in U.S. Treasury bills and corporate bonds, both of
which rely entirely on the prevailing interest rates. See MOAK & HILLHOUSE, supra note
43, at 203-06.
75. If other risks involved with derivatives cannot be controlled effectively, then the
risks may outweigh the costs, thus making legal-list prohibitions of derivatives the only
rational choice for state policymakers. Such risks include mistakes due to information
failures and sales of derivatives unsuited to investors' needs, due either to lack of inquiry
or lack of knowledge.
76. See supra note 21 for an example of hedging.
77. See Randy Hamilton, The World Turned Upside Down: The Contemporary
Revolution in State and Local Government Capital Financing, in CRISIS AND CONSTRAINT
IN MUNICIPAL FINANCE, 200, 200-20 (James H. Carr ed., 1984) (discussing ways to
incorporate derivatives into municipal bond issues to avoid fixed-rate obligations).
78. See supra part IV (discussing state and local regulation of municipal investing).
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deeply involved in the regulation of the nation's financial markets.79
The suitability doctrine offers a model for the regulation of derivatives
use by municipalities.8" The history and application of the doctrine are
relevant to the regulation of the investment process taking place in
municipalities.
Federal agencies recently have expressed both concern for the fiscal
viability of municipalities, and interest in protecting them from investing
their way into economic catastrophe."' Federal laws that regulate the
conduct of securities brokers" provide a model for reaching this goal.
In addition, state and federal regulation systems can function harmoni-
ously without being redundant or conflicting. 3 Given the variety of
79. For a brief history of the federal regulation of securities markets, see Elisabeth
Keller & Gregory A. Gehlmann, Introductory Comment: A Historical Introduction to the
Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 49 OHIO ST. L.J. 329
(1988).
80. In his article on the professional responsibilities of broker-dealers, Robert
Mundheim provides the following useful explanation of the suitability doctrine:
A suitability doctrine imposes a responsibility on the broker-dealer to take the
risk threshold of his customers into account when he recommends or sells
securities to them.
In a broad outline the suitability doctrine, as it develops, should require...
1. When a broker-dealer makes a recommendation to a customer, he must
recommend only those securities which he reasonably believes are suitable
for the customer-or, to put it another way, he may not recommend any
securities which he knows or should know would be unsuitable for that
customer.
2. Even when the broker-dealer makes no recommendation he still has a
responsibility to determine, on the basis of information which he has or
should have, that the risk aspects of the contemplated investment are within
the risk threshold of the customer who is purchasing the security.
Robert H. Mundheim, Professional Responsibilities of Broker-Dealers: The Suitability
Doctrine, 1965 DUKE LJ. 445, 449 (1965).
81. In October, 1993 the CFTC solicited comments on a proposal to exclude
municipalities from investing in swaps transactions. The proposal was "in part motivated
by the serious concern that [the CFTC had] about whether swaps transactions are being
marketed to unsophisticated entities. Even though they are institutions, a lot of less
sophisticated municipalities and others are suffering from very severe losses in that
market." 'Aggressive Enforcement,' Vows CFTC's New Chief, NAT'L L.J., Nov. 7, 1994,
at BI, B2 (quoting Mary Schapiro, Chair, CFTC) [hereinafter Schapiro Interview].
82. The Securities Exchange Act of 1934 defines the term "broker" as "any person
engaged in the business of effecting transactions in securities for the account of others, but
does not include a bank." 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(4) (1994).
83. For example, federal fraud charges against a broker operate independently of state
laws governing the permissibility of the fraudulent transaction.
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uses to which derivatives can be put," regulation that concentrates on
equitable dealing between brokers and municipal investors might better
address the shortcomings of municipal derivatives use than does a system
of legal lists.85
The federal government, whether acting through legislation or
through comprehensive administrative rulemaking, should reform and
clarify the scope of the "suitability" doctrine, making it equally
applicable to all types of derivative financial instruments. Moreover, the
federal government should explicitly permit municipalities to bring
private causes of action, if brokers give them recommendations unsuited
to their objective financial needs and circumstances.8 6
A. The Suitability Doctrine: Development and Limitations
The federal government has the means to deter the sale of unsuitable
derivatives to municipalities without impeding the sale of those that are
beneficial. The legal framework of the suitability doctrine provides a
ready structure within which the government can achieve this goal. The
Securities and Exchange Act of 1934 (SEA) 87 requires securities
associations to promulgate ethical self-regulatory guidelines as a
condition of registration with the SEC.88  The suitability doctrine
developed as a series of disciplinary measures contained in the ethical
rules of the National Association of Securities Dealers (NASD),89 the
84. See supra note 21 (describing hedging with derivatives); see also supra note 36
(describing speculating with derivatives).
85. See supra note 65 (defining the legal-list concept); see also supra note 66
(California's legal-list statute).
86. See infra part V.A. (discussing the suitability doctrine).
87. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78(a)-(1/) (1994).
88. The SEA of 1934 requires, as a condition of registration, that securities
associations promulgate rules, approved by the SEC, that "are designed to prevent
fraudulent and manipulative acts and practices, to promote just and equitable principles of
trade, . . . and, in general, to protect investors and the public interest" 15 U.S.C.
§ 78o-3(b)(6) (1994).
89. The NASD Rules of Fair Practice, Article III--"Business Conduct of Members,"
§ 2(a), provides:
In recommending to a customer the purchase, sale or exchange of any
security, a member shall have reasonable grounds for believing that the
recommendation is suitable for such customer upon the basis of the facts, if any,
disclosed by such customer as to his other security holdings and as to his
financial situation and needs.
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New York Stock Exchange (NYSE),9° and the American Exchange
(AMEX). 91
Notably, the self-regulatory guidelines did not provide the disgrun-
tled investor with a private cause of action against his broker.92
However, the SEC enacted Rule lOb-5 93 which, in part, embodies the
suitability requirements of the disciplinary rules.94 Rule 1Ob-5 has been
NASD SECURITIES DEALERS MANUAL (CCH) 2152, at 2041 (1990) (emphasis added).
The SEC interprets this rule as imposing an affirmative duty on the broker or dealer to
"attempt to obtain information concerning the customer's other security holdings, his
financial situation, and his needs so as to be in a position to judge the suitability of the
recommendation." In re Greenberg, 40 S.E.C. 133, 138 (1960) (affirming the expulsion
of a securities dealer from the NASD for, inter alia, recommending securities to customers
without first ascertaining whether the securities were suitable for the customers) (emphasis
added).
90. The Board of Directors of the New York Stock Exchange regulates the operations
of its individual members. Rule 405, governing the conduct of accounts, provides: "Every
member organization is required ... to use due diligence to learn the essential facts
relative to every customer, every order, every cash or margin account accepted or carried
by such organization and every person holding power of attorney over any account ....
2 N.Y.S.E. Guide (CCH) 2405, at 3696 (1984).
91. "Every member, member firm or member corporation shall use due diligence to
learn the essential facts relative to every customer and to every order or account accepted."
CONSTrUTION AND RULES, 2 Am. Stock Ex. Guide (CCH) 9431 (1993).
92. See, e.g., Hoxworth v. Blinder, Robinson & Co., 903 F.2d 186,200 (3d Cir. 1990)
(holding that NASD suitability rule grants no private right of action); Jablon v. Dean
Witter & Co., 614 F.2d 677, 681 (9th Cir. 1980) (holding that self-regulatory ethics rules
grant no private right of action). See also Colonial Realty Corp. v. Bache & Co., 358 F.2d
178, 181-82 (2d Cir. 1966) (reviewing congressional intent). But see Rolf v. Blyth
Eastman Dillon & Co., 424 F. Supp. 1021, 1041 (S.D.N.Y. 1977) (finding that NYSE and
NASD rules are "sufficiently precise to sustain a cause of action"), affid, 570 F.2d 38 (2d
Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1039 (1978).
93. Rule lOb-5 provides as follows:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any
means or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails or of any
facility of any national securities exchange, (a) To employ any device, scheme,
or artifice to defraud, (b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to
omit to state a material fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in
the light of the circumstances under which they were made, not misleading, or
(c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates or
would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person, in connection with the
purchase or sale of any security.
Manipulative and Deceptive Devices and Contrivances, 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1995).
94. Roy, 424 F. Supp. at 1041.
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interpreted to grant a private right of action.95 Under Rule lOb-5, an
investor must prove scienter to sustain a suit.96 In contrast to Rule lOb-
5, the proposed Derivatives Suitability Test,97 by excluding the scienter
requirement, arguably sets a strict liability standard.
Courts also enforce the suitability doctrine in actions for common
law fraud under state laws.98 When a broker knowingly recommends
an investment that is unsuitable for a client, the act is tantamount to
fraud.99 Furthermore, if recommendations are solicited, the suitability
doctrine imposes an affirmative duty on the part of a broker to know
enough about the client to make suitable recommendations of securi-
ties) °
The suitability doctrine is founded on the legitimate notion that
buyers of securities have less access to information and less market
sophistication than their brokers do.'l1 Further, the doctrine enforces
a broker's fiduciary duty and counterbalances the inherent conflict of
95. See, e.g., Village of Arlington Heights Police Pension Fund v. Poder, 700 F: Supp.
405, 407 (N.D. I11. 1988) ("Unsuitable trading clearly has been established as a basis for
10-b5 liability."). See also Keller & Gehlmann, supra note 79, at 344-45 ("In adopting
the federal securities laws, Congress recognized that private actions for damages could play
an important role in assuring compliance.').
96. See, e.g., Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 193 (1976) (holding that lOb-
5 actions require "intent to deceive, manipulate, or defraud" a client). See also Rolf v.
Blyth, Eastman Dillon & Co., 570 F.2d 38, 46 (2d Cir.) (finding that recklessness can
satisfy the scienter requirement), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1039 (1978).
97. See infra part V.C.
98. See, e.g., Twomey v. Mitchum, Jones & Templeton, Inc., 262 Cal. App. 2d 690,
720-22 (Cal. Ct. App. 1968). In Twomey, the court equated a breach of the suitability
doctrine with fraud and breach of fiduciary duty, and admonished that "[g]ood ethics
should not be ignored by the law. It would be inconsistent to suggest that a person should
be defrocked as a member of his calling, and yet not be liable for the injury which resulted
from his acts or omissions." Id. at 721-22.
99. "Unsuitability" rises to the level of fraud if a plaintiff can prove:
(1) that the securities purchased were unsuited to the buyer's needs; (2) that the
defendant knew or reasonably believed the securities were unsuited to the
buyer's needs; (3) that the defendant recommended or purchased the unsuitable
securities for the buyer anyway; (4) that, with scienter, the defendant made
material misrepresentations (or, owing a duty to the buyer, failed to disclose
material information) relating to the suitability of the securities; and (5) that the
buyer justifiably relied to its detriment on the defendant's fraudulent conduct.
Brown v. E. F. Htitton Group, Inc., 991 F.2d 1020, 1031 (2d Cir. 1993).
100. See In re Greenberg, 40 S.E.C. 133, 137-38 (1960).
101. See infra note 123 (discussing "boiler-room tactics").
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interest a broker has with regard to a client-the interest in making a
sale."02 The suitability doctrine articulates a duty of care that is
adaptable to any broker-client relationship. 3 The doctrine imposes a
risk of discipline (or of loss, in the case of a civil damages suit) on
brokers who knowingly make deals inconsistent with the risk tolerance
of their customers.1 4
Significant exceptions to the suitability doctrine serve to protect
brokers from unwarranted exposure to liability. For example, if a broker
notifies a client that a particular investment is unsuitable for the client,
the broker is deemed to have properly fulfilled the fiduciary duty owed
to the client. 05 Further, if a client directs a trade, without seeking any
type of recommendation from the broker, the client has no cause of
action against the broker.0 6
102. Unsuitability is distinct from, but related to, churning. Churning entails excessive
trading designed to advance the broker's interest in commissions in derogation of the
investor's financial interests. While churning relates to the "quantity" of trades,
unsuitability refers to the "quality" of the trades and implies that the trades were
inappropriate for the investment objectives. Nevertheless, they are often committed
together. Tiernan v. Blyth, Eastman, Dillon & Co., 719 F.2d 1, 5 (1st Cir. 1983).
103. The duty follows the contours of standard negligence doctrine: "[I]f the
probability be called P; the injury, L; and the burden, B; liability depends upon whether
B is less than L multiplied by P: i.e., whether B < PL." United States v. Carroll Towing
Co., 159 F.2d 169, 173 (2d Cir. 1947). See HARVEY E. BINES, THE LAW OF INVESTMENT
MANAGEMENT 4.03(1)(a)(ii) (1978). Further, the scope of the fiduciary relationship, and
thus the nature of the duties required of a broker, depends on a number of factors:
[T]here is in all cases a fiduciary duty owed by a stockbroker to his or her
customers; the scope of this duty depends on the specific facts and circumstanc-
es presented in a given case. These include the relative sophistication and
experience of the customer, the customer's ability to evaluate the broker's
recommendations and exercise an independent judgment thereon; the nature of
the account, whether discretionary or non-discretionary; and the actual financial
situation and needs of the customer.
Duffy v. Cavalier, 264 Cal. Rptr. 740, 753 n.10 (Cal. Ct. App. 1989).
104. Suitability is evaluated at the time of a recommendation, not in light of
subsequent events. Proposal to Adopt Rules Under Section 15(b)(10) of the Exchange Act,
Exchange Act Release No. 7984 [1996-1967 Transfer Binder] Fed. See. L. Rep. (CCH)
77,412, at 82,770 (Oct. 25, 1966).
105. See Mundheim, supra note 80, at 449.
106. See Powers v. Francis I. DuPont & Co., 344 F. Supp. 429, 433 (E.D. Pa. 1972)
(noting that a contrary result would turn a broker into an insurer for the client who would
"obviously be given an incentive to assume greater risks in the securities market, engaging
in excessive activity far beyond his means"). The Powers court also suggested a possible
exception in the case of a "compulsive investor" engaged in "irrational gambling." Id.
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In 1989, the SEC added a procedural embellishment to the
suitability rule with Rule 15g-9 (the Penny Stock Rule).0 7 Applicable
to risky, over-the-counter securities, the Penny Stock Rule mandates that
a broker provide in writing the basis for finding that a given stock is
suitable for a particular investor."8 This process accomplishes two
important goals: First, it forces the transfer of information between
buyer and seller; and secondly, it establishes clear accountability for the
trade on the part of the buyer.1' 9 The Penny Stock Rule thus provides
a model of one way the SEC can manage a category of investments that
may be unsuitably risky for the large majority of investors.
Unlike the SEC, which requires rules for all registered broker
associations, the Commodities Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) has
not implemented a suitability requirement for commodities dealers."0
Though the CFTC enforces the Commodities Exchange Act's (CEA)
antifraud provision, this statute does not include a suitability require-
ment."' Neither the CFTC"' nor the courts" 3 have been willing
107. Penny Stock Rule, 17 C.F.R. § 240.15g-9 (1989).
108. The "suitability" procedure, as summarized in the Penny Stock Rule, requires
"broker-dealers who recommend purchases of certain low-priced, non-NASDAQ
over-the-counter securities to persons who are not established customers ... to make a
documented suitability determination regarding the purchaser, and to obtain the purchaser's
written agreement to the first three purchases of these securities." Sales Practice
Requirements for Certain Low-Priced Securities, Security Exchange Act Release No. 34-
27160, 44 S.E.C. Dock. (CCH) at 600 (Aug. 22, 1989).
109, Comparably, if a broker fails to comply with the Penny Stock procedures, or
makes an inadequate determination of suitability given the facts, the broker's own
accountability for the loss is equally straightforward. Id.
110. The Federal Reserve Board has issued "appropriateness" guidelines, but they are
explicitly not intended for the protection of investors. Rather, the purpose is to preserve
the solvency of banking institutions by assuring that the investors with whom they contract
are likely to remain solvent. See OCC News Release, supra note 3 (announcing and
describing regulations).
111. See Commodity Exchange Act, 7 U.S.C. § 6b (1995) (antifraud provision).
112. See Welzant v. Merrill Lynch Futures, Inc., CFTC Docket No. 92-R030,
(C.F.T.C. Jan. 12, 1993) ("[T]his Commission has explicitly rejected any suitability rule
for this industry.") (citing Phacelli v. ContiCommodity Servs., Inc., [1986-1987 Transfer
Binder] Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) 23,250, at 32,674 (1986)) (CFTC refusing to imply
a suitability standard from text of CEA antifraud provision, in a case where plaintiff was
impoverished, partially deaf, functionally illiterate, and clearly did not understand the
nature of commodity trades his broker recommended and purchased with his life savings).
113. Puckett v. Rufenacht, Bromagen & Hertz, Inc., 903 F.2d 1014, 1020 (5th Cir.
1990) (refusing to imply suitability standard from text of CEA antifraud provision).
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to imply such a requirement from the statute. Because derivatives
regulation presently transcends the boundaries of the SEC and the
CFTC,' 14 it remains to be seen whether the future regulation of deriva-
tives, under an emerging new regulatory structure, will embrace the
suitability doctrine." s
B. Application of the Suitability Doctrine to Municipalities:
The Problem of the Sophisticated Investor
Municipalities present special regulatory problems. In addition to
federalism principles which define the role of the federal govern-
ment," 6 there remains the question of the municipality's status as a
naive or sophisticated investor. Despite the large sums of money
involved, many municipal investment decisions are overseen by relatively
inexperienced officials." 7 Currently, a broker's responsibility to an
investor may vary with the degree of the investor's knowledge.
The applicability of the suitability doctrine in cases involving large
and sophisticated investors is an unsettled area of law."8 Some courts
114. See supra note 3 (regarding the cross-agency apportioning of roles in the
regulation of the derivatives market).
115. Indeed, it remains an open question whether existing securities antifraud
provisions will be interpreted to apply to derivatives transactions:
The continuing evolution of new derivatives will provide further questions about
what derivatives fall within the federal securities laws' definition of a security.
Similarly, if derivatives are purchased by new classes of investors, issues such
as suitability may gain added importance. Because these principles have been
developed in cases which involved securities different in some respects from
derivatives, their exact application to derivatives will await further development
of the law.
Joseph I. Goldstein et al., Application ofthe Antifraud Provisions of the Federal Securities
Laws to the Sale of Derivatives, in MANAGEMENT AND AVOIDANCE OF DERIVATIVES
LITIGATION 243, 252 (PLI Corp. Law & Practice Course Handbook Series No. B-893,
1995).
116. See supra note 64.
117. See supra part III.A.
118. As a threshold issue, there is debate about whether large investors-corporations,
institutions, and government entities--should be considered sophisticated per se. See
generally Government Securities Reform: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Telecommu-
nications and Finance of the House Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 102d Cong., 1st
Sess. 7 (1991) (statement of Mario J. Palumbo, Attorney General of West Virginia) ("A
State is not a [sic] necessarily a sophisticated investor. In fact, most public entities can't
afford the best securities professionals and probably rely more on the dealers for
investment advice.").
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have claimed that an investor's sophistication does not affect the
suitability requirement for a broker."9 Other courts have held that
sophisticated investors have no action for unsuitability claims; typically
in these cases, the courts decline to recognize a fiduciary relation-
ship. ' Still other courts view sophistication as one of many factors
in determining the presence of a fiduciary relationship or the broker's
obligations under it."' Furthermore, the SEC has recognized the need
for suitability rules even for sophisticated investors. In a recent proposed
rulemaking under the Investment Advisors Act, the SEC suggested that
suitability rules should be applied to sales involving sophisticated
investors.
22
119. See Hanly v. SEC, 415 F.2d 589, 596 (2d Cir. 1969) ("The fact that ...
customers may be sophisticated and knowledgeable does not warrant a less stringent
standard.") (citing Lehigh Valley Trust Co. v. Central Nat'l Bank, 409 F.2d 989, 992 (5th
Cir. 1969) (holding that one bank could maintain an unsuitability action against another).
See also Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506, 526 (1974) (Douglas, J., dissenting)
("The Act does not speak in terms of 'sophisticated' as opposed to 'unsophisticated' people
dealing in securities. The rules when the giants play are the same as when the pygmies
enter the market.').
120. See Platsis v. E.F. Hutton & Co., 642 F. Supp. 1277 (W.D. Mich. 1986) (denying
presence of fiduciary duty due to plaintiff's sophistication and active participation), aff'd,
829 F.2d 13 (6th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 962 (1988); Leboce, S.A. v. Merrill
Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 709 F.2d 605 (9th Cir. 1983) (denying claim for
unsuitable trade based on theory of breach of fiduciary duty and citing the sophistication
of plaintiff in the transaction). Contra Duffy v. Cavalier, 215 Cal. App. 3d 1517, 1536
(Cal. Ct. App. 1989) (criticizing Leboce as a misapplication of California common law of
fiduciary duty).
121. See Duffy, 215 Cal. App. at 1536 n.10 (noting that scope of fiduciary duty owed
depends on a number of factors, including degree of sophistication of client). See also
Leib v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 461 F. Supp. 951,954-55 (E.D. Mich.
1978) (listing "age, education, intelligence," investment experience, naivete, degree of
personal involvement between parties, number of investments made without prior approval,
and degree of investor's interest in account as factors involved in determining locus of
control in a churning case), aff'd, 647 F.2d 165 (6th Cir. 1981).
122. The proposed rule under the Investment Advisors Act provides as follows:
The prohibition against providing unsuitable advice would apply to advice to
institutional clients as well as to individual clients. Institutional investors have
experienced significant losses as a result of recommendations to invest in
complex financial products that they did not fully understand. The rationale
underlying the duty to make suitable recommendations, although developed
largely in the context of investors who are not deemed to be "sophisticated,"
applies also to those who are ordinarily considered to be "sophisticated."
Suitability of Investment Advice Provided by Investment Advisers, 59 Fed. Reg. 13,464,
13,466 n.l I (1994) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. § 275) (proposed Mar. 22, 1994) (citations
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Applying the suitability doctrine to a large financial entity like a
municipality makes clear the two fundamentally different purposes the
ethical rules mandated by the SEA fulfill. First, the SEA seeks to protect
naive investors from unscrupulous or merely negligent brokers."
Second, the rules protect all investors and the reliability of the financial
exchanges in general, both by imposing a minimum duty upon brokers
and by eliminating unfair practices such as insider trading and price
manipulation. 2' As recent losses from municipalities make clear,
exempting brokers from their duties when dealing with large entities
because the entities are assumed to be "sophisticated," fails the second
purpose of the ethical rules.125 As a matter of public policy, at least
the same level of vigilance should be applicable to the municipal
purchase of derivatives as to sophisticated institutional investors.
Municipalities may have vast amounts of funds to invest and their
funds may be managed by financial officers who are experienced
accountants or financial planners. 126 These officers, however, may also
rely to a large extent on the representations of their brokers.'27 In the
complex financial world of derivatives, it is likely that brokers will have
a significant amount of influence over the purchasers of derivatives.'28
omitted).
123. The suitability rules of the NASD were crafted as a direct response to
"boiler-room" tactics: high-pressure telephone sales pitches that promised returns on
investments too good to be true. See United States v. Ross, 321 F.2d 61, 64 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 375 U.S. 894 (1963).
124. Andrews v. Blue, 489 F.2d 367, 373 (10th Cir. 1973) ("[SEA] is intended to
promote fill disclosure to every investor regardless of his particular business back-
ground."); SEC v. Bausch & Lomb, Inc., 420 F. Supp. 1226, 1228 (S.D.N.Y. 1976)
(stating that Rule lOb-5 was intended to "insure that even the most sophisticated investor
is not duped simply because he is not privy to information made available only to a
favored few").
125. "mhe problems which were once thought to concern only the 'unsophisticated'
market clearly prevail with institutional investors as well. They are capable of being sold
unsuitable investments given the variety and complexity of new securities and investment
strategies." Root, supra note 71, at 307-08. Indeed, the degree of systemic risk to the
financial world would be far greater with the collapse of a large corporation, bank, or
municipality than with the bankruptcy of an individual investor.
126. But see MOAK & HILLHOUSE, supra note 43, at 406 (noting the scarcity of
financial officers with adequate professional training).
127. Id. at 206 ("mhe degree of expertise required for successful investment... is
likely to be much greater than that possessed by, or available to, the average local
government [officer].").
128. See supra notes 122 and 125.
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Financial officers may understand the nature of derivatives, but it is less
likely that they appreciate the nuances as well as experts in the trade.1
29
Brokers should be held accountable for selling unsuitable derivatives
to municipalities. 30 Requiring reasonable accountability, following the
Penny Stock procedure,' 3' would supply brokers with a strong incentive
129. See Laura Jereski, Merrill Lynch Saw Big Profit on Orange Fund, WALL ST. J.,
Jan. 26, 1995, at A4. For example, Orange County lost substantial amounts of money on
a series of eight structured notes (mortgage derivatives). These investments gave returns
according to a complex formula based on the difference between a fixed rate and a
short-term floating rate, altered by a series of timed changes in the first (fixed) rate, with
a multiplier attached to the second rate. According to the former treasurer, Robert Citron,
the county found it difficult to simply determine the value of the notes without the aid of
its broker. Id.
Similarly, though fraud is not typical in derivatives transactions, the following excerpt
from a taped conversation shows the ease with which a derivatives dealer misled a
purchaser as to the extent of losses incurred: "I mean we told him $8.1 million when the
real number was 14. So now if the real number is 16, we'll tell him that it is 11. You
know, just slowly chip away at that differential between what it really is and what we're
telling him." Complaint, In re BT Sec. Corp., CFTC Docket No. 95-3, 1994 WL 711224
at *2 (C.F.T.C. Dec. 22, 1994).
130. One of Orange County's allegations in its case pending against Merrill Lynch
seeks affirmation of this notion under existing law:
As an expert in municipal finance, Merrill Lynch knew that the investment
scheme which it permitted and encouraged Citron to implement was wholly
inappropriate and unsuitable for the County for, among others, the following
reasons:
(a) Given their complexity, the investment transactions pursued by Citron
were not capable of being monitored without access to sophisticated
proprietary computer models and software which Merrill Lynch and other
prominent brokerage firms possessed, but which Merrill Lynch knew the
County did not have access to;
(b) Given their complexity and specialized nature, no ready and efficient
market (that is, where a small spread between bid and asking prices routinely
exist) existed for the instruments in which Citron invested since they were,
due to their complexity, only sold in negotiated transactions;
(c) These leveraged transactions exposed the County to enormous and
unacceptable levels of risk and jeopardized principal; and
(d) The investment program developed by Merrill Lynch did not conform to
the County's need for liquidity and thus jeopardized the County's ability to
provide essential services to its citizens.
Complaint, County of Orange v. Merrill Lynch & Co., at 30, in Denis M, Forster,
Derivative Litigation: An Overview-Liability Theories and Tactical Considerations, in
MANAGEMENT AND AVOIDANCE OF DERIVATIVES LmGATION, at 427,513 (PLI Corp. Law
& Practice Course Handbook Series No. B-893, 1995). Under present law, the legitimacy
of this complaint is unresolved.
131. See supra text accompanying notes 107-09.
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to take actions commensurate with the high standards of their profession
and the duties implicit in a fiduciary relationship. Prior to recommend-
ing the sale of derivatives to a municipality, a broker should be fully
informed about the risk tolerance of the municipality and the risk
characteristics of the product.' Thus, the broker must inquire into the
municipality's investment portfolio and liquidity needs.' Because the
basis for making a suitable recommendation entails the municipality's
objective needs and not the investment philosophy of its investment
officer, such inquiry would help to expose conflicts of interest between
a municipality and its investment officer. 34
132. A broker will almost certainly be able to determine the suitability of a particular
derivative for a municipality at lower cost than could the municipality itself. Such an
inquiry is essential when investing in derivatives; thus, it may be socially efficient to
mandate that brokers perform this function. See RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC
ANALYSIS OF LAW 111-13 (4th ed. 1992) (discussing situations in which information
disclosures may be mandated without causing a net efficiency loss to society). The
separate question of broker liability for failure, negligence, or fraud with regard to this
inquiry involves distinct economic considerations.
133. See Root, supra note 71, at 356-57 (presenting model letter to broker identifying
nature of investing institution, liquidity needs, and tolerance for hedging devices). Other
legal doctrines may likewise serve the purpose of ensuring that purchasers get what they
want. For example, because many purchasers invest in derivatives in order to hedge
against market risks to which they are exposed, the Uniform Commercial Code's Warranty
of Fitness for a Particular Purpose may provide a useful guide for fashioning an
appropriate standard of broker obligation in the specific context of requests for
recommendations for derivatives to hedge against a known risk exposure. The Warranty
of Fitness for a Particular Purpose provides as follows:
Where the seller at the time of contracting has reason to know any particular
purpose for which the goods are required and that the buyer is relying on the
seller's skill or judgment to select or furnish suitable goods, there is unless
excluded or modified under the next section an implied warranty that the goods
shall be fit for such purpose.
U.C.C. § 2-315 (1992). When a buyer requests a derivative in order to hedge against
specific risks, a broker should be able to warrant that a recommended derivative is suitable
for that particular purpose. Moreover, this requirement would create a sharp distinction
between derivatives purchased as hedges and those purchased for speculation. Such a
distinction would be very useful for effective state and local oversight of municipal
derivatives purchases.
134. See supra notes 46-50 and accompanying text (discussing a potential conflict of
interest between a financial officer's interest and the objective interest of a municipality's
portfolio). To accomplish this purpose, an actual portfolio or other independent proof of
tolerances should be sent to a broker.
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C. Proposal
The regulatory agency(s) responsible for derivatives oversight should
promulgate a rule incorporating the following principles:
DERIVATIVES SUITABILITY TEST (DST)
Before a broker recommends a derivative investment to a municipal-
ity, that broker shall:
1. Approve the buyer as a suitable derivatives candidate by
reference to an adequately detailed and current financial statement
supplied by the buyer. This process should occur once per fiscal quarter.
The broker should encourage the municipality to resubmit an updated
financial statement whenever the municipality makes significant changes
in asset allocation. For confirmation of exceptional trades, the broker
should obtain the name of a pre-designated second agent who is an
elected municipal official not working as a finance official;
2. Provide to the buyer, in writing, all recommendations made for
trading in derivatives, including a description of why each particular
derivative recommended is suitable for the buyer.
3. If a broker determines that a buyer is an unsuitable candidate for
derivatives and informs the buyer of such in writing, the broker may sell
derivatives to the buyer but must first follow PLAN B.
4. If a broker determines that a buyer is a suitable candidate for
derivatives but the buyer requests recommendations for an unsuitable
character of derivative for the buyer's portfolio, and the broker informs
the buyer of such in writing, the broker may sell these derivatives to the
buyer but must first follow PLAN B.
5. Violation of these rules may be cause for disciplinary action and,
if the violation results in harm, legal action.
PLAN B. No sales to unsuitable derivatives candidates or sales of
unsuitable derivatives may take place before the broker has received
approval or denial from a pre-designated second agent.
D. Discussion
The proposed rule adopts a suitability standard that is familiar to the
Self-Regulating Organizations (SROs),'35 the SEC, and the courts. 36
135. AMEX, NYSE and NASD are all self-regulating organizations.
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Unlike the original suitability rules, the DST incorporates a fixed
procedure.'37 Breach of the rule may result in disciplinary action by
the appropriate SRO, the SEC, or other appropriate oversight agency, and
may constitute a private right of action at law. 38 Failure to follow the
rule would create a presumption of unsuitability.'39 Alternatively,
properly following the established procedure would lead to a presumption
of suitability. 41
The DST's clearly defined procedure would provide brokers with
greater assurance that they are operating within the permissible parame-
ters of the law. Unlike the DST and the Penny Stock rule, the traditional
suitability doctrine often creates an ambiguous duty that diffuses a sense
of accountability between the two parties. This lack of clear accountabil-
ity may discourage vigilant oversight on both sides of the transaction.
It is unclear from the text of the DST whether a broker is liable if
that broker determines unsuitability, contacts a second agent, receives a
denial of approval, and yet makes a sale anyway.'4' This is a purpose-
ful ambiguity. To the extent that fear of liability may be used to deter
dangerous behavior, both parties should fear liability in this circum-
stance. Any pre-determined resolution of this state of affairs might
136. See supra notes 87-100 and accompanying text for a discussion of the suitability
rule and its use by the SROs, the SEC, and the courts.
137. In this regard, the DST is similar to the Penny Stock Rule as promulgated by the
SEC in 1989. See supra notes 107-09 and accompanying text.
138. This is a departure from the traditional suitability rule, which presently has
quasi-legal force through Rule lOb-5 and in common law actions for fraud, breach of
fiduciary duty, and breach of contract, but not as an independent cause of action outside
the disciplinary realm. See supra notes 93-97 and accompanying text (discussing
suitability and private rights of action). A private right of action is necessary in light of
the significant difficulties involved with regulating this large and complex area of finance.
The Chair of the CFTC recently discussed the limitations of her agency with regard to
overseeing derivatives transactions: "This is a highly technical and complex area of
financial regulation. We also need, therefore, to be able to hire very, very highly skilled
people. And we have the lowest pay of any financial regulator in the federal government."
Schapiro Interview, supra note 81, at B2.
139. The broker could rebut this presumption by demonstrating that the municipality
actually was a suitable derivatives buyer, that the broker actually sold suitable derivatives;
or that the pre-designated second agent granted the requisite permission. See DST Plan
B, supra part V.C.
140. A party could rebut the presumption of suitability by showing that the broker
improperly evaluated the portfolio, or that the broker failed to evaluate, or improperly
evaluated the derivative.
141. See DST Plan B, supra part V.C.
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create an incentive for one party to deny responsibility for reckless acts
and then hold the other party accountable. This also gives municipalities
an incentive to resolve issues about derivatives investing in advance of
a sale and promotes inquiry into the political repercussions of alterna-
tives.
VI. FUTURE ACCESS TO DERIVATIVES
There are two economic arguments against applying strong
suitability rules to municipal investors. First, any proposal that would
shift the risk of investment loss onto a broker would tend to increase the
cost of brokerage services. Second, any proposal that might encourage
litigation would increase the costs, or decrease the availability of
derivatives. In either case, the argument goes, the result would be a
decrease in appropriate municipal use of derivatives. 42
The argument that the threat of liability would discourage municipal
use of derivatives may be illusory. Municipalities may already be
reluctant to enter the derivatives market in the face of potential
catastrophic loss, while brokers may be wary of taking unknown risks.
Under the present state of the law, the private liability of brokers for
making unsuitable derivatives recommendations to municipalities is an
open question. 43 Furthermore, municipalities have no meaningful way
of knowing that the information they receive regarding derivatives is
complete or even adequate to inform them of potential risks." Clear
accountability, centered on the conveyance of information about risks,
would improve the confidence of municipalities investing in derivatives.
Healthy trade practices, reinforced by a strong suitability rule, should
make the market more attractive to prospective municipal investors.
By clarifying the scope of the suitability rule and spelling out the
contours of liability, brokers can avoid lawsuits brought by municipalities
142. "[P]lacing additional responsibilities on the dealer community-may entail
considerable indirect costs to the economy .... If... legal risks are exacerbated dealers
are likely to charge an additional premium . .. ." Derivative Financial Instruments
Relating to Banks and Financial Institutions: Hearings Before the Senate Comm. on
Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. 53 (1995) (statement of Alan
Greenspan, Chairman, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System).
143. See City of San Jose v. Paine, Webber, Jackson & Curtis, Inc., 1991 WL 352485
(N.D. Cal. 1991) (denying defendant's motion for J.N.O.V. and conceding that actual legal
basis for judgment under an unsuitability claim was "not clear").
144. See supra note 129.
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alleging unsuitability. The legal unsuitability rule that currently deters
broker activity does not contain clear, process-based rules that define
liability.4  By promulgating such rules, information would be more
readily disbursed between parties. In addition, brokers would know that
their actions were legal and proper.
An effective suitability rule for derivatives would have a further
benefit. State intervention to prohibit or severely curtail the sale of
derivatives to municipalities is a very real prospect.'14  This response
by the states would curb the evolution of the process of hedging risks
and could substantially decrease the market for derivatives.'47
VII. CONCLUSION
Derivatives are an extremely valuable form of financial technology.
Yet because of their complex nature, they are susceptible to misuse,
potentially causing great harm. Present regulations are inadequate to
ensure that risks are understood and minimized. This is especially true
for municipal investors, who are investing the funds that support their
communities' basic services.
The federal government can effectively solve many of these
problems in the specific case of municipal investors by instituting a
suitability rule like the proposed Derivatives Suitability Test. Such a rule
would increase the flow of information about risks and provide clear
rules of accountability in the sale of derivatives.
Timely federal government intervention may help to prevent the
next Orange County incident. Furthermore, it may prevent the need for
potentially over-restrictive state intervention that would inhibit the
evolution of this product in the service of municipal investing.
Peter M. Geckeler"
145. See supra part V.A.
146. Less than one month after Orange County declared bankruptcy, the California
State Legislature introduced a bill that would severely curb investments in derivatives. See
Reforms Sought By Legislature As Orange County Boosts Loss Estimate, 64 Banking Rep.
(BNA) (Jan. 2, 1995).
147. Academic-level mathematics research drives, in large part, the state-of-the-art
derivatives analysis. In a field where one must purchase innovation, this research is
extremely expensive, yet basically unpatentable. See Hu, supra note 40, at 1476-95
(discussing importance of capital-intensive research and development and the disincentive
to invest sufficient capital to reach a full understanding of the nature of the product
produced).
* J.D. 1996, Washington University.
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